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Institutional Affiliation and the Role of Venture Capital: 
Evidence from Initial Public Offerings in Japan 
Abstract 
The presence of venture capital in the ownership structure of U.S. firms going public has been 
associated with both improved long-term performance and lower underpricing at the time of the 
IPOs. In Japan, we find the long-run performance of venture capital-backed IPOs to be no better 
than that of other IPOs, with the exception of firms backed by foreign-owned or independent 
venture capitalists. Many of the major venture capital firms in Japan are subsidiaries of 
securities firms that may face a conflict of interest when underwriting the venture capital-backed 
issue. When venture capital holdings are broken down by their institutional affiliation, we find 
that firms with venture backing from securities company subsidiaries do not perform 
significantly worse over a three-year time horizon than other IPOs. On the other hand, we find 
that IPOs in which the lead venture capitalist is also the lead underwriter have higher initial 
returns than other venture capital-backed IPOs. The latter result suggests that conflicts of interest 
influence the initial pricing, but not the long-term performance, of initial public offerings in 
Japan. 
Institutional Affiliation and the Role of Venture Capital: 
Evidence from Initial Public Offerings in Japan 
I. Introduction 
Venture capitalists are increasingly recognized as financial intermediaries that overcome 
problems of moral hazard and asymmetric information in financial markets (Gompers (1995), 
Lerner (1995)). Empirical work focusing on the underpricing of initial public offerings (IPOs) 
suggests that venture capitalists in the United States, who take concentrated equity positions in 
the issuing firm and retain significant portions of their holdings subsequent to the IPO, are 
associated with a reduction in the underpricing of new issues (Megginson and Weiss (1991)). 
Lower initial returns have been viewed as due to venture capital's role in the certification of 
IPOs, and the reduction of information asymmetry between inside and outside investors. 
An alternative to the certification framework does not assume equilibrium, but instead 
permits the possibility that issuing firms and their financial advisors have some marketing power, 
with which they can influence either the offer price, the (short-run) market price, or both. This 
framework assumes that not all investors are sufficiently skeptical about firm quality, with the 
result that "hyping" a stock can be successful. (See Forsythe, Lundholm, and Rietz (1999) for 
experimental evidence that hyping a stock can be successful, and Lang and Lundholm (1999) for 
empirical evidence in the context of seasoned equity offerings.) 
Brav and Gompers (1997) report that venture capital-backed IPOs, unlike other IPOs, do 
not significantly underperform over the long term, suggesting that reputational concerns may 
constrain their actions. Reputational concerns may also be responsible for the fact that potential 
conflicts of interest on the part of venture capitalists appear to play little role in the pricing and 
performance of U.S. IPOs (Gompers and Lerner (1997)). A number of U.S. venture capital firms 
are subsidiaries of investment banks. If chosen as the lead underwriter, these investment banks 
have increased incentives to overstate the value of the IPO to investors. Gompers and Lerner, 
however, find no evidence that the offerings underwritten by affiliated investment banks perform 
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significantly worse over the long-term than other venture capital-backed issues. 
In this paper, we present tests of the "certification" and "conflict of interest" hypotheses. 
The evidence is from Japan, a country where venture capitalists frequently take stakes in firms 
prior to their IPO on the over-the-counter (OTC) market. We use a sample of IPOs that took 
place on Japan's OTC market between 1989 and 1995. We concentrate on the OTC market for 
three reasons: (1) Tokyo Stock Exchange-listed IPOs tend to be large offerings of mature firms, 
and in some cases represent the privatization of state-owned enterprises, for which venture 
capitalists do not play any role, (2) pure IPOs on stock exchanges (i.e., excluding transfers from 
the OTC to exchanges) occur much less frequently, and (3) just as Nasdaq is the primary venue 
for IPOs in the U.S., during the last decade the OTC market has become the primary venue in 
Japan. 
In a related study, Packer (1996) has examined the association of venture capital with the 
initial returns of 158 Japanese IPOs on the OTC between 1989 and 1991. Our study expands his 
sample considerably, including nearly 300 additional IPOs that took place between April 1991 
and December 1995. In addition, this study also explores the relation between venture capital 
investment and long-term IPO performance. While our main focus is on the role of venture 
capitalists in the IPO market, this is the first study of the long-run performance of Japanese firms 
going public in the OTC market. We use a combination of pricing and returns information that 
was previously unavailable to nonpractitioners. 
Of the 456 IPOs in our sample, nearly one-half had at least one venture capitalist as one 
of the firm's top 10 shareholders prior to the IPO. Unlike the U.S., venture capitalists are only 
rarely independent. Instead, they are usually affiliated with major financial institutions such as 
securities companies or banks. 
Venture capitalists that are owned by securities companies have the potential to present a 
conflict of interest of the sort discussed above. In all of the cases of our sample of Japanese IPOs 
in which the lead venture investor has a securities company parent, the related securities firm was 
part of the underwriting syndicate. In three-quarters of the cases, it was the lead underwriter. As 
an owner of the issuing company, the lead underwriter has an incentive to market an issue more 
aggressively and set a higher offer price than it would if it was acting solely as a financial 
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intermediary. If this conflict of interest were important but not fully recognized by investors, we 
would expect the IPOs where the lead underwriter was also the lead venture capitalist to exhibit 
exceptionally poor long-run performance. 
Equilibrium models based upon certification and screening predict that both the offer 
price and the market price should be at higher levels for "certified" issues, and the difference 
between the offer price and the market price should be less. Equilibrium models, by definition, 
predict no abnormal returns beyond the initial return period. If there are concerns about conflicts 
of interest, this should show up in increased underpricing and reduced price-earnings (P/E) ratios. 
Since information asymmetries deal with unobservable information, a stock which is discounted 
by the market would have a lower P/E ratio, holding other observable variables constant. In this 
paper, we examine both the P/E ratios of IPOs relative to comparable firms, and the long-term 
performance of IPOs relative to comparable firms. We also examine the short-run underpricing 
patterns. In Figures 1-3, we summarize the predictions of the conflict of interest and certification 
frameworks for P/E ratios (Figure 1), long-run performance (Figure 2), and short-run 
underpricing (Figure 3). 
Bank-affiliated venture capital does not present the same conflict of interest that 
securities firm-affiliated venture capital does, since commercial banks do not directly underwrite 
equity offerings in Japan. Because of a lending relationship with the issuer, it is possible that a 
bank-related venture capitalist will have better information than other venture capitalists. In the 
U.S., there is less underpricing when the firm has bank loans outstanding (James and Wier 
(1990)). Corporate bond issues in the U.S. underwritten by the Section 20 subsidiaries tend to 
have lower yield spreads at issue for risky firms when the related bank has a loan stake in the 
firm (Gande, Puri, Saunders, and Walter (1997)). For Japan, Hamao and Hoshi (1999) find 
similar results. This evidence is important because yield spreads are a measure of valuation. 
Bank-related venture capital is more long-term than that of other venture capitalists in 
terms of continuing to hold shares after the IPO. In the U.S., Field (1996) has found that IPOs 
with substantial institutional holdings post-IPO tend to outperform other IPOs. It is also possible 
that IPOs with backing from a bank-related venture capitalist may exhibit better long-term 
performance than other IPOs. In the U.S. bond market before Glass Steagall, both Puri (1996) 
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and Kroszner and Raj an (1994) find that bank underwritten issues were likely to result in fewer 
defaults than other bond issues.1 
Another form of shareholding which we examine along with that of venture capital is 
direct bank shareholding. Unlike the U.S., banks can own significant equity shares (up to 5 
percent of any single company) in Japanese firms. We also investigate the special role of 
keiretsu banks. A number of empirical studies have documented that the impact of a bank 
relationship in Japan can differ if it is a relationship with a keiretsu bank. Hoshi, Kashyap, and 
Scharfstein (1990) have found that firms in financial distress with a keiretsu bank affiliation are 
more likely to maintain investment levels, while Prowse (1990) presents evidence that keiretsu 
banks with substantial debt and equity stakes mitigate the agency costs of debt. It is possible that 
the role of banks in influencing the pricing and/or long-term performance of IPOs is greater for 
keiretsu banks than it is for other banks, because of the potential access to even greater inside 
information about firm quality than a non-keiretsu bank. Dewenter, Novaes, and Pettway (1997) 
find that, for a sample of Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE)-listed IPOs, keiretsu-linked IPOs have 
higher initial returns and somewhat worse long-run performance than other IPOs. 
Our principal empirical findings are as follows. First, we document average initial 
returns of 15.7% on 456 OTC IPOs from April 1989-December 1995. Pettway and Kaneko 
(1997, Table 2) report an average initial return of 12.7% for 69 TSE IPOs over the identical time 
period. We document average three-year buy-and-hold returns of -38.9% for 355 IPOs from 
April 1989 to December 1994, with nonissuing firms matched on size and industry having 
average three-year buy-and-hold returns of -28.2%. This results in a wealth relative of 0.851 
(=0.611/0.718). In other words, investing an equal amount in each of the IPOs would have left 
an investor with 85 percent as much wealth 3 years later than if the money had been invested in 
nonissuing firms. This three-year wealth relative is virtually identical to that reported by Cai and 
Wei (1997) for TSE-listed IPOs from 1989-1992 using an assets- and industry-matched 
benchmark. 
Second, in contrast to the U.S., venture capital-backed firms on the whole perform neither 
better nor worse than non-venture backed firms. When we distinguish venture capitalists by 
parental affiliation, the results differ somewhat. Firms whose lead venture capitalist is either 
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foreign-owned or independent perform noticeably better long-term than other IPOs. However, 
firms whose lead venture capitalist is affiliated with a securities company do not perform 
noticeably worse long-term than other IPOs. 
Third, consistent with Packer (1996), initial returns for venture capital-backed IPOs 
differ depending on institutional affiliation. While all of the other forms of venture capital appear 
to lead to lower initial returns— consistent with venture capital alleviating informational 
uncertainty about the IPO at the time of issue— IPOs backed by venture capitalists whose parent 
is the lead underwriter do not have lower initial returns. Since we did not observe long-term 
underperformance for this class of IPOs, this result is consistent with investors demanding more 
underpricing to compensate for the potential conflict of interest. 
Fourth, venture capital investment through bank subsidiaries appears to have an impact 
on underpricing distinct from that of direct bank investment. Bank-related venture capital 
investment is related to decreased underpricing, but this is not apparent in the case of direct bank 
investment. Neither form of bank investment affects long-term performance relative to that of 
non venture capital-backed firms. 
Finally, whether the bank is a keiretsu bank does not appear to influence the impact that 
bank-related venture capital or direct bank investment has on either underpricing or long-term 
performance. 
LaPorta et al (1999) argue that unregulated financial markets do not work well. Our 
findings suggest that, while reputation effects constrain the behavior of financial intermediaries 
faced with a conflict of interest in underwriting securities where they have an ownership stake, 
reputation effects may not completely overcome the conflicts of interest. Thus, unlike the 
conclusions from much of the academic literature using U.S. data, regulatory constraints may 
offer protection to investors who otherwise may be too gullible. Whether this is specific to Japan 
or not is an open question. Kang and Stulz (1996) conclude, for instance, that Japanese 
managers decide to issue shares based on different considerations than American managers. 
In the next section, we outline the relative importance of the OTC market in Japan, our 
principal data source for this paper, and changes in the regulatory regime governing IPOs. In 
section 3, we examine and quantify the types of holdings in privately held companies by venture 
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capital prior to the initial public offering. We highlight differences in investor behavior after the 
IPO by investor class. In section 4, the sample and data sources are introduced in detail, as well 
as the methodology. Section 5 presents statistical evidence concerning the influence of the 
different types of shareholding stakes on new issue underpricing, the long-term performance of 
IPOs, and P/E ratios relative to comparable firms. We end with a brief summation of our results 
and suggestions for future research in section 6. 
II. The OTC Market and Changes in the IPO Regulatory Regime: 1989-1995 
2.1 The OTC Market 
The recent history of initial public offerings in Japan has been characterized by the 
increasing importance of the over-the-counter market. In 1983, the Ministry of Finance relaxed 
regulations to allow companies to raise equity capital through the over-the-counter market. Firm 
age and per share dividend requirements were abolished, and a per-share profit requirement was 
relaxed from 10 yen per share after-tax to 10 yen per share before-tax. Requirements for the 
number of shares in the public float, shareholders, years with audited financial statements, years 
with dividend payments, and the amount of profits were already much lower than those of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). 
By the late 1980s, the OTC had become the central market for initial public offerings in 
Japan. Between April 1989 and December 1995, while Pettway and Kaneko (1997) report that 
69 firms publicly issued equity concurrent with a listing on the TSE, our sample of OTC IPOs 
totals more than 456 firms (Table 1). The OTC offerings in our sample tend to be fairly large, 
with mean gross proceeds of 4.8 billion yen, although of modest size relative to mean gross 
proceeds of 18.2 billion yen for Pettway and Kaneko's sample of TSE IPOs. (The yen/dollar 
exchange rate averaged about 120 yen per dollar during our sample period.) 
Firms that go public in Japan, including firms on the OTC, are much older on average 
than those that go public in the U.S. The average age of firms going public in our sample is 35 
years; by contrast, the average age of the 640 firm sample of U.S. IPOs from the mid-1980s 
studied in Megginson and Weiss (1991) was just over 10 years. The relatively high age numbers 
may be due in part to the requirement in Japan that firms show profits prior to going public. 
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Though less demanding for OTC IPOs than the TSE, each firm in our sample was required to 
show minimum pre-tax profits of 10 yen per share (and at least 1 million shares were to be 
outstanding prior to the IPO). There also was a paid-in capital minimum of 200 million yen 
(about $1.7 million).2 
2.2 Changes in Regulations 
The underpricing of initial public offerings in Japan has been well documented and until 
the 1990s had been much larger than that of the United States. In the 1980s, initial returns 
averaged 30-50 percent (Hebner and Hiraki (1993)). Underpricing was particularly large between 
1986 and 1988. During this period, the first closing market price of issues was around 55 percent 
higher than the offering price, with average initial returns of nearly 75 percent characterizing the 
1988 market (Jenkinson (1990)). These large initial returns became the target of public criticism 
during the Recruit scandal in which certain politicians, who were the recipients of preferentially 
allocated shares, made large capital gains. The scandal served as a stimulus to reform and led to 
a new system governing IPOs being implemented in April 1989.3 
Prior to reforms, the offering price for an IPO had been determined around 20 days prior 
to the offering date by comparing its financial ratios with those of a comparable listed company. 
The comparable company was chosen by the lead underwriter. The ratio of the offer price of the 
IPO to the share price of a comparable company was the simple average of the ratios of 
dividends, earnings, and book value per share to those of the comparable company. However, 
the underpricing that resulted suggests that the competitive pressures on securities companies to 
choose appropriate comparable companies were limited. 
In the 1989 reform, the Ministry of Finance decided to continue using a method based on 
the share price and financial ratios of a comparable company (though dropping dividends per 
share from the formula). However, the value that resulted was only to serve as a floor on the 
subsequent offer price. 30-40 percent of the shares being sold would be auctioned off in a 
discriminatory auction fully open to the public where a maximum limit price of 30 percent above 
the floor price was also established. The balance was to be sold at an offer price equal to the 
weighted average of successful bid prices.4 The first-stage auction occurred two weeks before 
the public offering of the balance and data such as the total amounts bid and the settlement price 
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were released to the public on the day of the auction. 
Auctions began in April 1989, and the evidence from TSE- and regional exchange-listed 
IPOs, presented by Hebner and Hiraki (1993), is that average initial returns decreased from 34 
percent to 21 percent. For our sample of 206 IPOs made on the OTC between April 1989 and 
March 1992, Table 1 reports an average initial return of 19.8 percent. Between April 1989 and 
March 1991, more than 50 percent of the first-stage auctions resulted in rationing at the upper 
limit price, suggesting that even after allowing for a value 30 percent greater than the price 
reached by a comparable company method, the offer price determined by the first-stage auction 
procedure did not reflect initial demand (Packer (1996)). 
In mid-December 1991, after a sharp market downturn, and a month-long period in which 
the first trading price was lower than the public offering price for more than half of around 30 
IPOs, regulators temporarily closed down the IPO market. The next new listing on the OTC 
market occurred in late May 1992. 
As the narrow band for the first-stage auction was particularly costly to underwriters in a 
down market, and there was a lack of a strong rationale for maintaining the band, the rules 
regarding the setting of the offer price were revised twice within a year. First, starting in April 
1992, the minimum bid price for auctions of newly listed stock was dropped from 100 percent to 
85 percent of the "theoretical price" based on related companies, and the ceiling on the bids in 
the auction was removed. Second, starting in January 1993, the lead underwriter was allowed to 
discount the issue from the initial offer price determined at the auction. Initial returns on IPOs 
subsequent to this combination of revisions, through the end of our sample period in 1995, 
averaged 12.3 percent (Table 1), a significantly lower level than in 1989-1991. 
Table 1 also reports the mean 3-year holding period return for the IPOs, and the mean 3-
year return in excess of that realized by an industry- and size-matched non-IPO portfolio (the 
matching procedure is described more fully in section 4). The holding period returns are 
calculated from the first market price of the IPO. The table also reports the 3-year wealth 
relative— determined by dividing the average gross 3-year holding period IPO return by the 
average gross return of industry- and size-matched firms. 
Inspection of Table 1 reveals that in two of the cohort years of our sample, 1989 and 
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1991, IPOs on the OTC in Japan had average excess returns that were positive; however they 
were only 0.2% and 1.5%, respectively. For all IPOs issued during April 1989-March 1992, the 
3-year holding period return averaged -51.1%, around 7% less than the industry and size-matched 
firms, giving a wealth relative of 0.892. For IPOs issued during April 1992-December 1994, 
while the mean 3-year return was nearly identical, the wealth relative is only 0.799. The overall 
3-year wealth relative of 0.851 is just under that of 0.86 documented for IPOs from 1989 to 1992 
on the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Cai and Wei (1997)), and somewhat above the 0.80 documented 
for IPOs in the U.S. between 1970 and 1990 in Loughran and Ritter (1995) using size-matched 
firms. Thus, the long-term underperformance of initial public offerings is apparent in our 
sample, as it has been in the majority of studies around the world (see Loughran, Ritter, and 
Rydqvist(1994)). 
Starting in September 1997, after our sample period for Japanese IPOs, both the OTC and 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange offered firms and their underwriters the option of instituting a book-
building process for the determination of the initial offer price instead of the first-stage auction. 
Book-building rapidly displaced auctions as the principal means of determining offer prices for 
IPOs. Apparently, there was a strong demand from underwriters for alternatives to the auction 
system. 
III. Types of Venture Capital in Japan and Bank Shareholding 
3.1 Venture Capital in Japan 
There are significant differences between venture capital in Japan and the United States. 
For one, the industry is more concentrated than in the United States. Of the aggregate investment 
portfolio of 877 billion yen reported by the respondents to a 1997 survey of major venture capital 
firms, the top 4 firms accounted for 46.1 percent, while the top 10 accounted for 66.5 percent 
(Nikkei Kinyu Shimbun (1997)). Secondly, venture capital companies which invest in unlisted 
companies tend to be relatively young. The first private venture capital firms in Japan were 
established in the early 1970s. The median year of establishment for the ten largest private 
venture capital firms listed in the above-mentioned survey is 1983. 
One striking characteristic of Japanese venture capital is that none of the leading venture 
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capital firms are independent. Among the top twenty-five venture capital firms listed in the 
Nikkei survey, 11 were the affiliates of banks, and 8 were the affiliates of securities firms; the 
rest were either semi-governmental institutions (3), the affiliates of non-bank financial 
institutions (2), or the affiliate of a software company (l).5 
Unlike the United States, where many venture capitalists specialize in taking an active 
role in the financing and advising of young companies, venture capital investing in Japan is not 
associated with an active monitoring role. In fact, until 1995, the anti-monopoly law prohibited 
employees of a venture capital firm from being on the board of directors of a firm that it invested 
in. Venture capital's relatively inactive role in the governance of the firm is paralleled by a 
pattern of providing financing relatively late in the life cycle of portfolio companies. The 
Ministry of International Trade and Industry's (MITI) estimate of the percent of new Japanese 
venture capital funding during fiscal year 1995 that went to startup firms is 3 percent, much 
lower than the 30 percent reported for U.S. venture capital. At the other extreme, 38 percent 
went to firms over 20 years of age (Venture Enterprise Center (1997) and Isoda (1997)). 
Consistent with the tendency to invest in relatively mature companies, there is no strong high-
tech bias in venture capital investments in Japan, unlike the U.S. 
While Japanese venture capitalists may fund more established firms and provide less 
managerial advice, they still generally invest with the objective of holding on to the shares until 
the company goes public. According to an estimate of Isoda (1997), 58 percent of the venture 
capital investment in Japan, on an investment-cost weighted base, results in an IPO. The 
comparative numbers for U.S. and European venture capital are 47 percent and 31 percent. The 
Japanese percentage is relatively high due to the aversion to investments in startups, which are 
more likely to result in disposition via bankruptcy or acquisition at a fire-sale price. 
3.2 Characteristics of Venture Capital-backed IPOs 
The presence of venture capital in Japanese IPOs is clearly evident in Table 2 when we 
examine the ownership of our sample of 456 firms which went public in Japan between 1989 and 
1995 on the OTC market. 210 firms, or 46 percent, have a venture capitalist among the top 10 
shareholders prior to listing. 
Table 2 also compares the characteristics of these venture capital-backed IPOs with the 
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rest of the IPO sample. The size of the IPO, as measured by gross proceeds, averages 4.2 billion 
yen (about $35 million U.S.) for venture capital-backed IPOs; the median is 2.6 billion yen. Both 
the mean and median are significantly smaller than those of the non-venture IPOs. Similar to the 
U.S., venture-capital backed IPOs tend to be younger than other IPOs. 
Underpricing of venture capital-backed IPOs tends to be greater than that of other IPOs in 
Japan. The mean of 19.2 percent and median of 8 percent are both significantly higher than those 
of other IPOs. While this pattern was not found in the U.S. (See Megginson and Weiss (1991, 
Table VI) and Barry, Muscarella, Peavy, and Vetsuypens (1990, Table 4)) for IPOs from the 
1980s, we show below that in the 1990s, the U.S. pattern has become more similar to that of 
Japan. Increased underpricing on average might suggest that venture capital does not alleviate 
informational problems by certifying the quality of the IPO firm. In our regressions to be 
reported later, we will control for other firm-specific variables such as size and age, which may 
affect underpricing independently of venture capital participation. 
The book-to-market measures are not significantly different between venture capital-
backed and other IPOs, and the means and medians of the 3-year returns, excess returns, and 
wealth relatives are also not statistically different. During our sample period, IPOs in Japan have 
been a relatively poor investment regardless of whether they had venture capital-backing or not. 
Table 3 reports that the average stake of the lead venture capitalist is 5.92 percent, less 
than one-half of the participation documented in similar studies of the United States. On 
average, the post-IPO equity share held by the lead venture capitalist declines by around 40 
percent of the pre-IPO share. Since the increase in the number of shares outstanding from a 
public offering is limited to 30 percent, this implies that some cashing out by the venture capital 
investors occurs either during the offering or its immediate aftermath. This pattern differs from 
that in the U.S., where venture capitalists rarely sell shares in the IPO (Barry et al, 1990). 
3.3 Small Business Investment Companies. 
There appear to be distinct patterns in the behavior of venture capital depending on 
institutional affiliation. The oldest venture capital firms in Japan are the semi-governmental 
institutions. In 1963, Small Business Investment Companies (SBIC) were set up in Tokyo, 
Nagoya, and Osaka by the enactment of the Small Business Investment Law under MITI's 
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initiative. Capital was contributed into these SBICs by both local government institutions and 
local financial institutions and companies. Regulations limited their investment to small, yet 
profitable, dividend paying companies, and further required that the investment be at least 15 
percent of the total equity (Clark (1988)). 
Because of their early start, the investments outstanding of the three SBICs are relatively 
large, and the Tokyo and Osaka SBICs were ranked 7th and 9th in the 1997 Nikkei survey of 
venture capital firms, based on outstanding investments. The fruits of past SBIC investment 
decisions are evident in our sample of IPOs. Table 3 indicates that they were the leading venture 
capitalist in 24 out of the 210 cases in which pre-IPO venture capital funding occurred. A 
distinctive feature of SBIC cases is that they are the leading venture capital shareholder in almost 
every case in which their investment appears. This phenomenon reflects the minimum 
shareholding requirement at the time of the investment. By the time of the IPO, however, they 
usually hold less than 15 percent, since other private equity investments occurred between their 
investment and the time of the IPO. 
3.4 Securities Company-Affiliated Venture Capital. 
Another class of players in the Japanese venture capital industry are those companies 
which are affiliates of a Japanese securities company. Five out of the top ten, and eight out of the 
top twenty-five, firms in 1997 were affiliated with securities companies. A striking parallel with 
the securities industry is the dominance of one firm (Table 4). Nomura Securities' affiliated 
subsidiary, Japan Affiliated Finance Company (JAFCO) accounted for 21.7 percent of the 
reported stock of investment by private venture capital in Japan in 1997. In addition to its market 
share dominance, JAFCO is also the only venture capital firm which has publicly traded shares. 
Securities firm-affiliated venture capitalists are the most numerous in the pre-IPO 
investment ledger of our sample (Table 3). 99 of the 210 firms with venture capital funding had 
as their lead venture capitalist one that was affiliated with a securities firm. Another 32 had one 
as a secondary provider of venture funds. Thus, more than 28 percent of the entire IPO sample, 
and 60 percent of the venture capital-backed sample, had a securities firm-affiliated venture 
capitalist among their top ten shareholders. 
Venture capitalists affiliated with securities companies may intend to obtain the lead 
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underwriter position for the parent if the company goes public. It is customary for the managing 
underwriter to underwrite around 40-60 percent of the issue itself compared to 25-35 in the U.S. 
(Sutton and Benedetto (1990)). Thus, it obtains most of the gross spread, which is customarily 
set at about 3.5% of the offer price. In Table 4, the relationship between venture capital 
participation and the position of the lead underwriter is documented for our sample. A company 
with a securities company-affiliated venture capitalist among its top ten shareholders chooses 
that company as its lead underwriter more than 75 percent of the time. 
In the analysis to follow, we will be examining whether the impact of securities firm-
affiliated venture capital investment differs if the venture capitalist is also affiliated with the lead 
underwriter. There is reason to believe that a managing underwriter may have better information 
about the quality of the firm.6 At the same time, the lead underwriter faces a greater conflict of 
interest when it also holds a stake in the firm through a venture capital subsidiary. The managing 
underwriter may have an increased incentive to market the issue and generate overly optimistic 
forecasts of the firm's prospects. The greater tendency of securities firm-affiliated venture 
capital to cash out at the IPO merely exacerbates this conflict of interest. 
Of course, there is also the possibility that concerns over reputation may constrain the 
securities company and/or related venture capitalist from overpricing an IPO. Gompers and 
Lerner (1997) have found no evidence that the conflicts of interests between underwriter and 
their captive venture capital subsidiaries affects either after-market performance of IPOs or the 
magnitude of underpricing at issue. In the context of underpricing alone, Beatty and Ritter 
(1986) have found evidence that the market "punishes those underwriters who cheat." Carter and 
Manaster (1990) and others have found empirical evidence of significantly negative relations 
between underwriter prestige and the magnitude of underpricing.7 
3.5 Bank-Affiliated Venture Capital. 
The third major class of players in the Japanese venture capital industry are companies 
which are affiliates of Japanese banks. Two out of the top ten, and eleven out of the top twenty-
five firms in the industry, are affiliated with commercial banks. In our 456 firm IPO sample, the 
presence of bank venture capital subsidiaries among the top ten shareholders is almost as 
frequent as that of the securities firm subsidiaries (Table 3). More than one-third of the 210 
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venture capital-backed IPOs have a bank subsidiary as their lead venture capitalist prior to the 
IPO. 
Bank-affiliated venture capital involvement appears to be somewhat more long-term 
oriented than its securities company-affiliated counterpart. The percentage of equity held by the 
lead venture capitalist increases from 4.3% pre-IPO to 4.5% afterwards (Table 3). Bank-
affiliated venture capital shareholding is often associated with a lending relationship. In more 
than one-half of the cases of bank-affiliated venture capital investment, the related bank is listed 
as the top transaction bank. Holding shares in the firm is sometimes viewed as a mechanism 
through which Japanese banks reduce the agency costs associated with debt (Prowse (1990), 
Aoki (1988)). Bank shareholding through venture capital subsidiaries may also be of relevance 
to the costs of information asymmetries in going public as well. 
3.5 Foreign and Independent Venture Capital 
The final class of venture capital firms are either foreign or independent. IPO firms with 
foreign or independent venture capital involvement comprised less than 10% of all IPOs (Table 
3). Cases in which the lead venture capitalist fell into this category were distinct in two respects. 
First, the foreign/independent venture capitalist tended to own a larger share of the firm prior to 
the IPO — 8.4% on average — than either bank- or securities firm-affiliated venture capitalists. 
Second, the foreign/independent venture capitalist, when it was the lead, tended to be a part of a 
larger syndicate. The mean number of venture capitalists as major shareholders, 1.9, and the 
mean percentage of equity held by all venture capitalists, 11.5%, are large relative to the other 
classes of venture capital (Table 3). 
3.6 Direct Bank Shareholding. 
Unlike U.S. banks, which cannot hold stocks of nonfinancial corporations, Japanese 
banks are allowed to take equity positions in Japanese companies.8 Thus, banks may invest in 
the firm prior to the IPO directly and not just through venture capital subsidiaries. As with that 
of their venture capital subsidiaries, bank shareholding is usually associated with a lending 
relationship. In our sample, the lead bank shareholder subsequent to the IPO is listed as the top 
transaction bank by the firm more than 80 percent of the time. 
The recruitment of banks as major shareholders generally occurs well in advance of going 
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public, and is usually given high priority in "how to go public" manuals in Japan (Kakitsuka 
(1989)). The emphasis is usually on the creation of stable shareholders and by extension the 
minimization of "floating" shareholdings which can fall into unfriendly hands. As stable 
shareholders, banks are not only expected to hold on to their pre-IPO shares, but also to buy up 
shares in the offering or after-market to preserve or increase the proportion of their holdings. 
In Table 5, we see that the presence of banks as major shareholders for companies going 
public is more common than that of venture capitalists. 363 firms, or 78% of our sample, have at 
least one bank as one of their top ten shareholders prior to going public. The average percent 
holding for the lead bank is somewhat lower than that documented for venture capitalists — 
around 2.9% (remember that any one bank cannot hold more than 5% of the equity). Keiretsu 
banks, which are the lead banks around two-thirds of the time, tend to own a little less equity 
(2.6%) and tend to be accompanied by fewer banks when they hold shares. 
An important difference between direct bank shareholding and the behavior of most of 
the more formal forms of venture capital shareholding can be seen in the columns that document 
post-IPO holdings. Not only do more banks on average enter the ranks of the top ten 
shareholders with a larger aggregate share, but the share of the lead bank shareholder increases 
subsequent to the IPO to 3.3% on average. Banks increase their shareholding either during or 
subsequent to the IPO. Because of this, it is possible that direct bank shareholding may have 
more credibility as a mechanism of certification than that of the formal venture capital 
institutions in Japan. 
IV. Data and Methodology for Tests Using Returns 
4.1 Sample Selection and Data. 
Because we only have records of long-term (three-year) performance through December 
31, 1997, we restrict our sample for the analysis that follows to those IPOs between April 1989 
(the introduction of the auction system) and December 31, 1994. The 101 OTC-listed IPOs from 
1995 are not used for our long-term performance analysis. 
For each IPO firm, matching listed firms were searched for. First, firms in the same four-
digit industry classification were first chosen from all firms that have been traded (on either the 
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OTC market or the Tokyo Stock Exchange) for more than three years. These firms are then 
divided into deciles according to the market value of equity. We choose firms in the same size 
decile as the IPO firm to be industry and size-matched firms. If there is more than one qualifying 
matching firm, we form a portfolio of matching firms. In this matching, we lost 56 firms from 
our observations because of the lack of a comparable firm, resulting in 355 IPO firms between 
April 1989 and December 1994. The 3-year excess return is calculated as the three year buy-and-
hold return for the IPO (from the end of first trading day price) minus the average three-year buy-
and-hold return over the same period for the matched non-IPO firms. IPO firms that are delisted 
are included until the date of delisting. Reflecting the relative infrequency of delistings, in no 
case did a portfolio of matching firms cease to have at least one component firm. 
Data on individual daily stock prices and OTC index values are taken from the Nikkei 
NEEDS electronic database. Shareholding data, firm size and age, as well as identification of the 
transaction bank and lead underwriter, are taken from various editions of the Japanese language 
version of the Kaisha Shiki Ho (Japan Company Handbook). Price and quantity information 
about the auction and initial public offerings were provided by Daiwa Securities, including the 
number of shares put up for sale, the allowable bid interval, the number of bids submitted, and 
weighted average of bids (offering price) from the auction. 
4.2 Methodology and Variables Used 
To test our hypotheses, we estimate two sets of regressions using returns. First, we 
regress the 3-year excess return (over matched firms) on control variables and dummies 
accounting for different types of IPO shareholding. Second, we estimate the impact of different 
types of pre-IPO shareholding on the difference between the offering price and the first trading 
price. We have designed the estimation procedures to control for important institutional features 
of the IPO process in Japan as well as other factors commonly used in empirical tests of the 
determinants of the long-term performance and initial return of IPOs. 
Size, Book-to-Market, and Age. The first set of equations, estimating the determinants of 
long-term performance, includes three control variables. We include the natural logarithm of 
offer proceeds. Smaller firms tend to perform worse in studies of long-term performance in the 
United States (Ritter (1991), Brav and Gompers (1997)). We also include the natural logarithm 
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of the firm's book-to-market equity ratio, based on the first market price of the share subsequent 
to the IPO and the post-issue book value. Finally, we include the natural logarithm of the age of 
the firm. 
The second set of equations, estimating the determinants of underpricing, includes each 
of the three control variables discussed above, with the modification that the market value of the 
book-to-market ratio is estimated using the lower limit of the auction bid range. Issues with 
greater ex ante uncertainty should be most subject to the winner's curse and thus equilibrium 
underpricing. Both age and offering proceeds are commonly used proxies for ex ante 
uncertainty. 
The second set of regressions also includes the following additional variables to account 
for the IPO regulatory regimes. 
Auction Results. As explained above, the offering price is determined in an auction of 
part of the issue, which occurs two weeks before the trading of the issue. During the April 1989 -
March 1991 period, the offering price was constrained to be within a price range determined by 
the comparable company method. These results are revealed to all potential subsequent 
subscribers to the issue. In addition to the offering price (the weighted average of successful 
bids), the most informative single number is the ratio of the number of total bids submitted at the 
auction to the number of shares auctioned. This number is particularly important should the 
issue have been sold out at the upper limit price during the first IPO pricing regime of 1989-
1991, as it proxies for the number of bidders rationed out of the issue on a non-price basis. We 
include the ratio of this number to the total number of shares issued as a variable ("Subscription 
Ratio") which we expect to be positively related to expectations after the auction concerning the 
actual value of the issue. Since the effect of the subscription ratio should differ depending on the 
allowable bids, we allow the coefficient on the subscription ratio to differ depending on each of 
the regimes by including three variables, each of which is the subscription ratio during one 
regime, 0 otherwise. 
A problem with using the subscription ratio as an explanatory variable is that it is 
endogenous: the popularity of the auction may also reflect variables such as ex ante uncertainty 
as well as the venture capital dummies, and it is likely to be correlated with the disturbance term 
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of the equation. Since the OLS estimator is biased, even asymptotically, in this case we use the 
method of instrumental variables. The instrument is that suggested by the 2SLS procedure. 
Namely, the subscription ratio is regressed against the three exogenous variables described 
above, an additional variable which measures market movement over the period between setting 
of the auction price parameters and the actual auction itself, and the venture capital dummies 
described below. The estimated values for the subscription ratio which result are then used as 
the instrumental variable for the subscription ratio. 
Institutional Lag. In general there is a time lag between the auction and the formation of 
an initial trading price of usually two weeks. To the extent that the value of the issue is related to 
that of the market, market movements in the interim period will affect the initial trading price 
relative to the offer price. Thus, a variable is included which is the return of the Nikkei OTC 
index during the time period between the company's auction and formation of an initial trading 
price. We expect the coefficient on this variable to be positive and significant. 
Regime Dummies. As discussed above, there were three distinct IPO regulatory regimes 
during the period of our sample (1989-1991, 1992, and 1993-1995). The second and third 
regime are distinguished by fewer constraints on the first stage bidding, and the third regime is 
distinguished by increased discretion awarded the underwriter to discount the issue from the 
price reached at the auction if market conditions warranted. We are already controlling for how 
these regimes may change the influence of the subscription ratio as a predictor of underpricing. 
We include two straight regime dummies as well to control for any additional impact regime 
changes had on the absolute level of underpricing. 
Venture Indicators. For both the long-term performance and underpricing regressions, 
we include six different specifications which differ in their combination of variables indicating 
venture capital participation. In specification (1), we include an indicator variable that equals 
one if any venture capitalist is on the list of top ten shareholders. Specification (2) is identical to 
specification (1) except that we include an additional indicator variable which equals one if the 
IPO also has a direct bank investor among its list of 10 largest shareholders prior to the IPO that 
is greater than any of the venture capital investors. In specification (3), we include four mutually 
exclusive indicator variables that equal one if the lead venture capitalist of the IPO was affiliated 
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with a securities firm, a bank, an SBIC, or was foreign/independent, respectively. Specifications 
(4) and (5) include dummy variables measuring whether a securities firm-affiliated venture 
capitalist was or was not the lead underwriter. In specification (5), we include a dummy variable 
for whether the IPO also has a direct bank investor among its largest pre-issue shareholders. 
In specification (6), we also include seven exclusive indicator variables, but this time 
divide up the indicator variable for bank-related venture capital backing into one that equals one 
if the related bank was a keiretsu bank, another equaling one if the related bank was not a 
keiretsu bank. Two additional indicator variables are added: the first of which equals one if there 
is a direct keiretsu bank investor among the top ten shareholders that holds more shares than the 
venture capital investors, the second that equals one if the direct bank investment is from a non-
keiretsu bank. 
V. Empirical Evidence 
5.1 Sample Summary Statistics. 
In Table 6, characteristics of the firms going public on the OTC in the years 1989-1994 
are presented according to the existence and type of venture backing, and the presence of direct 
bank investment. Since full three-year performance histories are not available for IPOs after 
1994, we do not include them in the regression analysis to follow. Striking differences are 
evident in the summary statistics when we divide up the sample by different types of venture 
capital. 
As shown in Table 6, the firms in which SBICs invest are much older than average (43.2 
years as opposed to 33.0 years) at the time of the IPO and have a much smaller issue size. 
Furthermore, the book-to-market ratio is much higher. The initial return on SBIC-backed issues 
is generally lower, and the subsequent 3-year excess return and wealth relatives are among the 
worst of the different venture capital-backed IPO categories. 
Venture capital-backed issues in which a securities company affiliate was the lead venture 
capitalist tend to be slightly younger and somewhat larger. The initial returns and the long-term 
returns are about the same as for the entire venture capital-backed sample. Firms in which the 
venture capital backing comes from a firm related to the lead underwriter tend to be larger than 
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the others, have only slightly worse long-term performance than the other securities company 
venture capital-backed IPOs, and initial returns are slightly lower. These results are not 
suggestive of conflicts of interest which would lead to worse long-term performance and 
increased underpricing at the time of issue. 
New stock issues in which a bank-affiliated venture capital firm is the lead venture 
capitalist also tend to be slightly younger and somewhat larger than other venture capital-backed 
IPOs. The initial returns average slightly lower than other venture backed issues, but the long-
term excess returns of -16% are worse than other venture backed IPOs, with the exception of the 
SBIC-backed issues. Larger distinctions are apparent from the sample of keiretsu bank-affiliated 
venture capital-backed IPOs. These tend to be around the same size as other venture-capital-
backed IPOs, but exhibit dramatically less underpricing at the time of issue (10.2% versus an 
average of 20.0%). At the same time, the 3-year excess return is about the same as the bank-
affiliated venture capital-backed IPO average, though still worse than the entire venture-backed 
average of-9.6%. 
The one category of venture capital-backed IPOs for which positive excess returns are 
apparent are those by foreign or independent firms. These firms are also characterized by lower 
book-to-market ratios and exhibit very high average initial returns. 
The final two rows of Table 6 give summary statistics for those cases of direct bank 
investment in which their holdings exceeded those of the venture capitalists. These IPOs tend to 
be slightly larger than the venture capital-backed IPOs. They tend to be slightly older, have 
lower initial returns, and somewhat less negative long-term returns than venture capital-backed 
IPOs. When we examine IPOs with direct keiretsu bank investment in isolation, they tend to be 
even larger, have even lower initial returns but more negative long-term returns than other IPOs 
with direct bank investment. These numbers suggest that the type of firm that banks (both 
keiretsu and non-keiretsu) invest in directly prior to the IPO differ from the type that they invest 
in through their venture capital subsidiary. Dewenter, Novaes, and Pettway (1997), in an 
examination of TSE-listed IPOs, find that IPOs affiliated with a keiretsu bank have higher initial 
returns, a finding that contrasts with our results. 
5.2 Determinants of Long-Term Performance. 
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Table 7 reports the results of the six specifications of the long-term performance 
regressions discussed in section 4.2 above. In an attempt to partly control for omitted factors, we 
include cohort year dummy variables (whose coefficients are not reported) to account for yearly 
fixed effects. Since many of the return intervals overlap, they are subject to common (omitted) 
factors, and thus the heteroskedasticity-corrected t-statistics may still overstate the significance 
levels. 
In all specifications, the coefficients on gross proceeds and book-to-market are 
insignificantly different from zero. The coefficient on age is always significantly negative. 
Older firms tend to exhibit systematically worse long-term performance relative to matched 
firms. The first and simplest specification suggests that venture capital-backed issues, taken as a 
whole and controlling for other factors, perform neither worse nor better than other IPOs. The 
coefficient estimate is both economically and statistically insignificant. Although the coefficient 
on direct bank invested IPOs is much larger and indicates 7.8% better performance than other 
IPOs, it also is not statistically significant (t-statistic of 1.45). 
In regression (3) with the four venture-capital dummies separated by institutional 
affiliation, we find a positive coefficient on one of the four variables that is marginally significant 
(t=1.64). Venture capital-backed firms where the lead venture capitalist is either foreign or 
independent exhibit better performance relative to a matched sample than do other IPOs: 27 
percent better over three years. Other forms of venture backing, however, do not appear to relate 
to significant differences in long-term performance relative to other IPOs. 
The coefficients from regressions (4) and (5) indicate that no special distinction can be 
made among securities company-affiliated venture capital-backed IPOs in which the parent also 
is the managing underwriter of the IPO, and those in which it is not. The coefficients are 
individually insignificant, and F-tests indicate that the negative coefficients for the indicator 
variables for the two types of securities firm-affiliated venture capital are not significantly 
different from each other. 
The results from the remaining regressions are also negative. Regression (6) indicates 
that the insignificance of bank venture backing to long-term performance is independent of the 
keiretsu affiliation of the bank. Regression (5) confirms that direct bank investment is not 
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associated with changes in long-term performance, and regression 6 indicates that the 
insignificance of bank direct investment is independent of whether the bank is a keiretsu bank. 
5.3 Determinants of Underpricing 
As mentioned in the introduction, evidence from the U.S. using IPOs from the 1980s is 
that venture capital-backed IPOs are underpriced to a lesser extent than non-venture capital-
backed IPOs. Two of the major studies are summarized in Table 8. While the study of Barry, 
Muscarella, Peavy, and Vestuypens (1990) found no significant difference, based on a t-test of 
differences of means, Megginson and Weiss (1991) found in multiple regression analysis that 
venture capital-backed IPOs had significantly less underpricing than a matched sample of non 
venture capital-backed IPOs. This has been interpreted as consistent with venture capitalists 
certifying IPOs, and a reduction in information asymmetry between inside and outside investors. 
In the third panel of Table 8, we report the results from U.S. IPOs over the same time 
period — 1989-1995 — as our sample of Japanese IPOs. In sharp contrast to the U.S. evidence 
from the 1980s, venture capital-backed IPOs have been more underpriced than non venture 
capital-backed IPOs. The average initial return on venture capital-backed IPOs is 14.7%, 
compared to an average of 11.3% for other IPOs. The association of venture capital backing with 
greater initial returns stands up in unreported regressions that control for some of the other cross-
sectional determinants of short-run underpricing, including six industry dummy variables. Thus, 
the relation of U.S. venture-capital backing to IPO initial returns appears to have shifted over 
time. 
We report the detailed results for our sample of Japanese IPOs from April 1989-
December 1995 in Table 9. The table reports six specifications of the underpricing regressions. 
The resulting adjusted-R2 statistics round to 0.13 to 0.15 for the six specifications, at the upper 
end of the range of adjusted-R2 statistics of 0.07 to 0.15 for most of the studies purporting to 
explain cross-sectional variation in the underpricing of IPOs in the United States. In all 
specifications, the instrument for the subscription ratio, age, book-to-market, and gross proceeds 
are significantly positive. The latter three results are surprising since there is reason to expect 
that ex-ante uncertainty would be less for older firms and larger issues, and for firms with higher 
book-to-market ratios. Nonetheless, underpricing is systematically greater for these firms. As 
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expected, the institutional lag variable comes in positive, though it is not statistically significant 
in any of the specifications. Regression (1) of Table 9 indicates that venture capital-backed 
issues exhibit a significant reduction in underpricing relative to other IPOs. On average, the 
reduction in underpricing is nearly 11 percent (t-statistic -2.39). This is in contrast the U.S. 
pattern during the same sample period, reported in Table 8. In regression (3) with the four 
venture-capital dummies separated by institutional affiliation, we find a negative coefficient on 
all four of the variables. 
In regression (4) it is apparent that all of the reduced underpricing associated with 
securities firm-related venture backing occurs when the securities firm is not the managing 
underwriter of the issue. The coefficient on the indicator variable for the managing underwriter 
is insignificantly different from zero, while the coefficient on the other securities firm-related 
venture capital variable is a highly significant -0.35. Thus the underpricing is not reduced when 
the managing underwriter of the issue faces a clear conflict of interest. The differences in 
underpricing depending on the potential for conflict of interest contrasts sharply with the results 
for long-term performance. 
Just as in the long-term performance regressions, the coefficient estimates of regression 
(6) suggests that there is no significant difference between the certification effect of bank-related 
venture capital (or direct bank) investment depending on whether the bank is a keiretsu bank or 
not. In addition, the estimates of regressions (2), (3), (4) and (5) indicate that the reduction in 
underpricing that might be expected from bank certification of the quality of the IPO is only 
associated with investment through the bank venture capital subsidiary, and not with direct bank 
investment. At least for this sample, bank certification through pre-IPO investment appears to be 
limited to their venture capital subsidiaries and does not differ by keiretsu affiliation. 
5.4 IPO Valuation. 
Finally, we investigate how institutional affiliation affects the level of the pricing of 
initial public offerings in Japan relative to comparable firms. As discussed in the introduction, 
concerns over conflict of interest should show up in the levels of price-earnings (P/E) ratios at 
the time of issue. If investors are not sufficiently skeptical, and issuing firms and their financial 
advisors have marketing power, "hyping" the stock may result in a P/E ratio at the time of the 
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offering and in the early after-market that is considerably above those of comparables. 
In the first panel of Table 10, we report the mean P/E ratios for IPOs and comparable 
firms, as well as a t-test for pairwise differences. Venture capital-backed IPOs where the lead 
underwriter is also a securities firm that has a venture stake have a mean P/E ratio of 34, which is 
higher than the mean P/E of 29.6 for their comparables. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that these IPOs are priced more aggressively when they are brought to market. However, the 
statistical significance of the difference is marginal (t=1.48). In addition, IPOs backed by this 
class of venture capital did not tend to perform worse than others long-term. 
In the second panel of Table 10, we report the percentage of earnings forecasts for the 
period subsequent to the IPO that were above realized earnings. This evidence is not consistent 
with a conflict of interest effect. While 61 percent of the forecasted earnings of IPOs backed by 
securities firm-affiliated venture capital that was not the affiliate of the lead underwriter 
exceeded realized earnings, in the more frequently observed cases when the securities venture 
capital-backed firm had the parent as a lead underwriter, only 49 percent of the time did 
forecasted earnings exceeded realized earnings. Thus, lead underwriters did not appear to 
generate overly optimistic forecasts for the current accounting period for those IPOs in which it 
has a venture capital stake. 
VI. Conclusion 
The presence of venture capital in the ownership structure of U.S. firms going public has 
been associated with improved long-term performance. In Japan, most of the major venture 
capital firms are subsidiaries of securities firms and banks. Using a sample of firms going public 
on the OTC during April 1989-December 1995, we document short-run underpricing and long-
run negative abnormal returns that are similar to those documented in other studies using Tokyo 
Stock Exchange-listed IPOs. Specifically, we report average initial returns of 15.7 percent, and a 
three-year wealth relative of 0.85, calculated as the ratio of the average gross return on IPOs 
(from the first closing market price) relative to the average gross return on a size/industry 
matched sample of nonissuing firms. 
We find that venture capital-backed IPOs in Japan do not perform better in the long run 
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than other IPOs relative to size/industry matched firms, with the exception of firms backed by 
foreign owned or independent venture capitalists. When venture capital holdings are broken 
down by their institutional affiliation, we find that firms with venture backing from securities 
company subsidiaries do not have excess returns that are significantly different than other IPOs. 
This suggests that conflicts of interest do not influence the long-term performance of initial 
public offerings in Japan. While there is more short-term underpricing for venture capital-
backed IPOs, once other determinants of underpricing are controlled for, venture capital-backed 
IPOs are actually underpriced less. This is consistent with venture capital playing a certification 
role in alleviating informational uncertainty about the IPO at the time of issue. Issues for which 
the lead underwriter is also the parent of the lead venture capitalist, however, do not show 
reduced initial returns. This suggests that investors in the primary market may demand more 
underpricing to compensate for the potential conflict of interest. Surprisingly, while the 
distinction between bank-related venture capital and direct bank ownership appears important in 
the pricing of IPOs, whether the related bank is a keiretsu bank or not does not. 
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VII. Endnotes 
1. Within the bank underwritten issues of the pre-Glass-Steagall era, there was considerable 
heterogeneity as well. Kroszner and Raj an (1997) have found that securities underwritten by the 
bank that did not set up an organization structure that separated lending and underwriting, and 
thus had more perceived potential for conflicts of interest, were discounted relative to 
comparable securities underwritten by another organization. 
2. In July 1995, a new special section on the OTC was created in which profit requirements were 
abolished and paid-in capital requirements were reduced; however, the new section has failed to 
attract more than a handful of listings. Another indication of the relative maturity of IPO firms 
in Japan is the relative paucity of technology firms listed on the OTC. For example, the market 
share of computer and communications firms (of total market cap of OTC firms) in September 
1997 is 2.4 percent, only one-tenth the corresponding percentage for Nasdaq in December 1996 
(Isoda(1997)). 
3. See Shihon Shijo Kenkyukai (Committee on Capital Markets, and advisory committee for the 
Ministry of Finance) (1989), or Pettway and Kaneko (1996). 
4. If the issue was overbid at the maximum limit price, then rationing of the bids at the first stage 
would occur according to strict lottery. 
5. There were 88 respondents to the Nikkei survey. A more comprehensive list from late 1997 of 
167 venture capital companies and their affiliation is contained in Isoda (1997). This list 
indicates that 80 of the companies were bank affiliated, 22 securities company-affiliated, 25 
trading, leasing, or manufacturing company affiliated, 12 insurance company affiliated, 5 
government affiliated, 4 foreign, and 19 independent. 
6. The responsibilities of the lead underwriter are substantial. The lead underwriter has the 
responsibility for preparing the application documents for listing. In the case of an OTC 
company, it is also given the responsibility for the official investigation of the financial condition 
of the company. 
7. This pattern has reversed in the 1990s, however. See Beatty and Welch (1996). 
8. U.S. banks can still act as agents of "certification" through the provision of loans ("inside 
debt"). In fact, U.S. studies show that IPOs of firms with credit relationships with private lenders 
are less severely underpriced on average (James and Weir (1990)). In the Japanese context, the 
loan/no loan dichotomy is not quite as interesting, since only extremely rarely does a firm go 
public without having bank loans on its books. 
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Figure 1 — Predictions regarding price/earnings (P/E) ratios valued at the offering price. The left 
column lists the predictions if reputation effects dominate among underwriters, whereas the right 
column lists the predictions if conflicts of interest are of paramount importance. The top row lists the 
predictions assuming that investors fully anticipate the incentives of underwriters, and set market prices 
accordingly. Thus, if conflicts of interest are important, but are anticipated by investors, issues where 
underwriters have an incentive to set a higher offering price will show lower P/E ratios because 
investors rationally demand a "lemons" discount. The bottom row lists the predictions assuming that 
investors are not sufficiently skeptical. This gives an incentive for underwriters to set an extremely high 
offering price when they have a strong conflict of interest, so there will be a higher P/E, the greater is 
the conflict of interest. 
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Figure 2 — Predictions regarding long-run abnormal returns, measured from the first closing market 
price. The left column lists the predictions if reputation effects dominate among underwriters, whereas 
the right column lists the predictions if conflicts of interest are of paramount importance. The top row 
lists the predictions assuming that investors fully anticipate the incentives of underwriters. As with any 
model assuming investor rationality, there are no predictable long-run abnormal returns. The bottom 
row lists the predictions assuming that investors are not sufficiently skeptical. This gives an incentive 
for underwriters to set an extremely high offering price when they have a strong conflict of interest. 
Since investors are insufficiently skeptical, investors receive a low long-run return when their 
expectations are systematically disappointed if conflicts of interest dominate. 
44 
Figure 3 — Predictions regarding short-run underpricing. The left column lists the predictions if 
reputation effects dominate among underwriters, whereas the right column lists the predictions if 
conflicts of interest are of paramount importance. The top row lists the predictions assuming that 
investors fully anticipate the incentives of underwriters. Thus, if conflicts of interest are important, but 
are anticipated by investors, issues where underwriters have an incentive to set a higher offering price 
will show a lower initial return because investors are willing to pay a market price no higher than if the 
offering price had been set lower. The bottom row lists the predictions assuming that investors are not 
sufficiently skeptical. This gives an incentive for underwriters to set an extremely high offering price 
when they have a strong conflict of interest. Since investors are insufficiently skeptical, investors still 
bid up the market price, albeit by not as much as if the issue had been priced less aggressively. 
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